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On May 17, 1954, the United States Supreme Court ruled, in the landmark case of Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka, that "separate but equal" educational facilities were "inherently unequal," and therefore segregation in public education was unconstitutional. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the overriding decision, and Thurgood Marshall headed the legal defense team of the NAACP.
BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, KANSAS, 1954
74 Supreme Court Reporter, p. 686-693
347 U.S. 483
BROWN ET AL. V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, SHAWNEE COUNTY, KAN., ET AL.
BRIGGS ET AL. V. ELLOITT ET AL.
DAVIS ET AL. V. COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY, VA., ET AL.
GEBHART ET AL. V. BELTON ET AL.
Reargued Dec. 7, 8, 9, 1953.
Decided May 17, 1954.
No. 10:
Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia,
and Delaware. They are premised on different facts and different local
conditions, but a common legal question justifies their consideration
together in this consolidated opinion.
In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal
representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the
public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis. In each
instance, they have been denied admission to schools attended by white
children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race.
This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal
protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases
other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied
relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called "separate but equal" doctrine
announced by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256. Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these
facilities be separate. In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware
adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the
white schools because of their superiority to the Negro schools.
The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not "equal" and
cannot be made "equal," and that hence they are deprived of the equal
protection of the laws. Because of the obvious importance of the question
presented, the Court took jurisdiction. Argument was heard in the 1952 Term, and reargument was heard this Term on certain questions propounded by the Court.
Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among "all persons born or naturalized in the United States." Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with and degree of certainty.
An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment's history,
with respect to segregated schools, is the status of public education at
that time. In the South, the movement toward free common schools, supported by general taxation, had not yet taken hold. Education of white children was largely in the hands of private groups. Education of Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiterate. In fact, any
education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in
contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and
sciences as well as in the business and professional world. It is true that
public school education at the time of the Amendment had advanced further in
the North, but the effect of the Amendment on Northern States was generally
ignored in the congressional debates. Even in the North, the conditions of
public education did not approximate those existing today. The curriculum
was usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in rural areas; the
school term was but three months a year in many states; and compulsory
school attendance was virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not
surprising that there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education.
In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment,
decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as proscribing
all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race. The doctrine of
"separate but equal" did not make its appearance in this Court until 1896 in
the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, involving not education but
transportation. American courts have since labored with the doctrine for
over half a century. In this Court, there have been six cases involving the
"separate but equal" doctrine in the field of public education. In Cumming
v. Board of Education of Richmond County, 175 U.S. 528, 20 S.Ct. 197, 44
L.Ed. 262, and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 48 S.Ct. 91, 72 L.Ed. 172, the validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged. In more recent cases,
all on the graduate school level, inequality was found in that specific
benefits enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro students of the same educational qualifications. State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct. 232, 83 L.Ed. 208; Sipuel v. Board of Regents of
University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631, 68 S.Ct. 299, 92 L.Ed. 247; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70 S.Ct. 848, 94 L.Ed. 1114; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 70 S.Ct. 851, 94 L.Ed. 1149. In none of these cases was it necessary to re-examine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in Sweatt v. Painter, supra, the Court expressly
reserved decision on the question whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be held
inapplicable to public education.
In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike
Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below that the Negro and white schools
involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to
buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other
"tangible" factors. Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a
comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools involved
in each of the cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation
itself on public education.
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Fersugon was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way
can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these
plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures
for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of
our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It
is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in
public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical
facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children
of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it
does.
In Sweatt v. Painter, supra [339 U.S. 629, 70 S.Ct. 850], in finding that a
segregated law school for Negroes could not provide them equal educational
opportunities, this Court relied in large part on "those qualities which are
incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law
school." In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra [339 U.S. 637, 70
S.Ct. 853], the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white
graduate school be treated like all other students, again resorted to
intangible considerations: "* * * his ability to study, to engage in
discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to
learn his profession." Such considerations apply with added force to
children in grade and high schools. To separate them from others of similar
age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation
on their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the
Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the
Negro plaintiffs:
"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it
has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is
usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense
of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with
the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational
and mental] development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. Any language in Plessy v. Fersugon contrary to this finding is rejected.
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate
but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly
situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the
segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this
decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the
formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable
complexity. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief was
necessarily subordinated to the primary question the constitutionality of
segregation in public education. We have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties are requested to present further
argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court for the
reargument this Term. The Attorney General of the United States is again
invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the states requiring or
permitting segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear
as amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs of October 1, 1954.
It is so ordered.
Cases ordered restored to docket for further argument on question of
appropriate decrees.
State v. Boon (1801)
HALL, J. The prisoner has been found guilty of the offense charged in the
indictment [Boon was indicted and convicted under the third section of the
act of 1791 for killing a slave belonging to another]; whether any, or what
punishment, can be inflicted upon him in consequence thereof, is not to be
decided. . . .
We must consider the words of the enacting clause, without regard to the
preamble. . . . If any person hereafter shall be guilty of killing a slave
&c. such offender shall be adjudged guilty of murder &c. and shall suffer
the same punishment, as if he had killed a free man. In case the person had
killed a free man what punishment would the law have inflicted upon him?
Before this question can be solved another must be asked; because upon that,
the solution of the first depends. What sort of a killing was it? or what
circumstances of aggravation or mitigation attended it? . . . That to which
the Legislature referred us for the purpose of ascertaining the punishment,
proper to be inflicted is, in itself, so doubtful and uncertain that I think
no punishment whatever can be inflicted; without using a discretion and
indulging a latitude, which in criminal cases, ought never to be allowed a Judge.
. . . Much latitude of construction ought not to be permitted to operate
against life; if it operate at all, it should be in favor of it. Punishments
ought to be plainly defined and easy to be understood; they ought not to
depend upon construction or arbitrary discretion. . . .
But it has been also contended, on behalf of the state, that the offense
with which the prisoner is charged, is a felony at common law, and that
having been found guilty by the jury, he ought to be punished, independently
of any Act of Assembly on the subject. . . .
Slaves in this country possess no such rights; their condition is . . .
abject; . . . they are not parties to our constitution; it was not made for them.
. . . it is doubtful whether the offense with which he is charged is a
felony at common law or not. It is doubtful whether he ought to be punished
or not, that, certainly, is a sufficient reason for discharging him . . . I
cannot hesitate to say, that he ought to be discharged.
JOHNSTON, J. The murder of a slave, appears to me, a crime of the most
atrocious and barbarous nature; much more so than killing a person who is
free, and on an equal footing. It is an evidence of a most depraved and
cruel disposition, to murder one, so much in your power, that he is
incapable of making resistance, even in his own defense . . . and had there
been nothing in our acts of Assembly, I should not hesitate on this occasion
to have pronounced sentence of death on the prisoner.
. . . From the context, and taking every part of the section [of the act of
1791] under consideration, there remains no doubt in my mind respecting the
intention of the Legislature; but the judges in this country . . . have laid
down, and invariably adhered to, very strict rules in the construction of
penal statutes in favor of life . . .
. . . judgment in this case should be arrested.
TAYLOR, JR. . . . But when the court is called upon, under an act of
Assembly, to pronounce the highest punishment known to the law, they must be satisfied that the language used is clear and explicit to the object
intended . . . I think no judgment can be pronounced.
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